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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Relator Thomas M. Zizic, M.D. (“Zizic”) filed this qui 
tam1
                                              
1 The term “qui tam” is an abbreviation of the phrase 
“‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur,’ which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord 
the King’s behalf as well as his own.’”  United States ex rel. 
Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 509 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000)).  
Generally, qui tam actions permit private parties to sue to 
enforce the law on the Government’s behalf and reward 
successful plaintiffs with part of the recovery.  United States 
ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 
647 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 suit under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 
3729-33, alleging that Q2Administrators, LLC (“Q2A”) and 
RiverTrust Solutions, Inc. (“RTS”) fraudulently billed the 
United States for the unperformed review of benefit claim 
denials that was required by the Medicare Act (“Medicare”), 
42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) regulations, and their Government 
contracts.  Q2A and RTS moved to dismiss Zizic’s claims for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1).  The District Court dismissed the 
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complaint with prejudice, concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction because the allegations against Q2A and RTS 
were based on certain prior public disclosures and because 
Zizic was not an original source of that information.  For the 
reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because Zizic’s FCA claims allege Medicare fraud, we 
first describe those two statutory schemes.  Next, we relate 
the relevant factual background of this case.2
A. 
  We finally 
recount the procedural history of this appeal. 
 Zizic asserts claims under the FCA, which punishes 
the knowing presentation of a fraudulent demand for payment 
to the United States, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & 
(b)(2)(A)(i), and permits a private relator to bring a qui tam 
civil suit in the Government’s name, § 3730(b)(1).  To 
proceed with the suit, the relator must serve on the 
Government a written statement disclosing “substantially all 
material evidence and information the person possesses.”  § 
3730(b)(2).  If the Government declines to take over the case, 
§ 3730(b)(4)(B), the successful relator is entitled to 
                                              
2 The factual background is only partially drawn from 
Zizic’s pleadings.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 514 (recognizing 
that we may properly consult external evidence in a factual 
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)). 
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reasonable expenses, attorney’s fees, and between 25% and 
30% of the proceeds of the litigation, § 3730(d)(2), which 
include civil penalties and treble damages, § 3729(a)(1).  
Importantly, the FCA’s public disclosure bar divests a court 
of subject matter jurisdiction over a qui tam suit that is based 
on allegations or transactions that have been publicly 
disclosed in certain sources, unless a relator is an original 
source of that information.  § 3730(e)(4).3
 Zizic’s FCA claims are based on allegations of fraud 
related to Medicare, a federal health insurance program for 
the aged and disabled.  Medicare Part B subsidizes the costs 
 
                                              
3 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 
119, 901-02 (2010), amended the FCA’s public disclosure 
bar.  But because that amendment is not retroactively 
applicable to pending cases like Zizic’s, Graham Cnty. Soil & 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 
U.S. 280, 283 n.1 (2010), we will discuss the pre-PPACA 
version of the public disclosure bar, see Schindler Elevator 
Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1889 n.1 
(2011).  Both the Supreme Court and this Court have 
frequently detailed the pre-PPACA legislative history of the 
public disclosure bar, and we will not do so again here.  See, 
e.g., Kirk, 131 S. Ct. at 1893-94; Wilson, 559 U.S. at 293-
300; United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 
734, 738-40 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by 
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280; United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, 
Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. The Prudential Ins. Co., 944 
F.2d 1149, 1152-54 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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of covered medical services and devices.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395k(a).  Covered medical supplies include certain durable 
medical equipment (“DME”), § 1395x(n) & (s)(6), which are 
“reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of 
illness or injury,” § 1395y(a)(1)(A). 
 HHS contracts out the administration of DME 
coverage determinations to a DME Medicare administrative 
contractor (“DMAC”).  § 1395u(a).  The DMAC may make 
an “initial determination” whether a claimant is entitled to 
benefits, § 1395ff(a)(1)(A), based in part on whether a DME 
is “reasonable and necessary,” 68 Fed. Reg. 63,692, 63,693 
(Nov. 7, 2003).  If the DMAC denies the claim, the claimant 
may engage in a five-step appeals process.  First, the claimant 
may request a “redetermination” by the same DMAC.  42 
U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(3). 
 Second, the claimant may request a “reconsideration,” 
§ 1395ff(b)(1)(A), by a qualified independent contractor 
(“QIC”), § 1395ff(c)(1), which must have “sufficient medical 
. . . and other expertise . . . and sufficient staffing” for such 
reconsiderations, § 1395ff(c)(3)(A).  If the initial 
determination was based on whether the DME is medically 
reasonable and necessary, then the QIC’s review “shall 
include consideration of the facts and circumstances of the 
initial determination by a panel of physicians or other 
appropriate health care professionals.”  § 1395ff(c)(3)(B)(i).  
Similarly, “[w]here a claim pertains to . . . the provision of 
items or services by a physician, a reviewing professional 
must be a physician.”  42 C.F.R. § 405.968(c)(3).  The QIC’s 
decision with respect to whether the DME is medically 
reasonable and necessary must “be based on applicable 
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information, including clinical experience (including the 
medical records of the individual involved) and medical, 
technical, and scientific evidence,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ff(c)(3)(B)(i), and must include “an explanation of the 
medical and scientific rationale for the decision,” 
§ 1395ff(c)(3)(E). 
 Third, the claimant may appeal to an administrative 
law judge (“ALJ”), § 1395ff(b)(1)(A) & (d)(1)(A), who 
reviews the QIC record, § 1395ff(c)(3)(J).  Fourth, the 
claimant may appeal to the Medicare Appeals Counsel within 
the Departmental Appeals Board.  § 1395ff(b)(1)(A) & 
(d)(2)(A).  Finally, the claimant may seek judicial review.  § 
1395ff(b)(1)(A) & § 405(g). 
B. 
 Zizic is the former President and CEO of the now-
bankrupt BioniCare Medical Technologies, Inc. 
(“BioniCare”), a company formed to commercialize the BIO-
1000, a DME designed to treat osteoarthritis of the knee.  
BioniCare attempted to bill Medicare for the BIO-1000, but 
many claims were denied as not medically reasonable and 
necessary.  Zizic personally participated on behalf of 
BioniCare in the ALJ appeals of the QIC’s denials of the 
BIO-1000 claims. 
 From July 2005 to about December 2006, Q2A 
contracted with HHS to serve as the QIC responsible for 
review of all DME claim denials across the nation.  Q2A 
frequently denied BIO-1000 claims, always as medically 
unreasonable and unnecessary.  However, Q2A’s decisions 
 
8 
were reached without the physician review required by the 
Medicare Act, HHS regulations, and its Government contract, 
as demonstrated by the lack of evidence of such review in the 
ALJ files. 
 According to a March 28, 2007 affidavit by Wayne 
van Halem (“van Halem”), a former Q2A employee who 
managed all DME appeals for all DMAC regions from 
November 2005 to September 2006, Q2A employed only 
three or four physicians to review several hundred daily 
appeals of claim denials.  Because Q2A was short-staffed, it 
first implemented an internal policy to deny all BIO-1000 
claims, which were reviewed by a single nurse rather than a 
panel of physicians.  Then, Q2A allowed non-physician 
subcontractors to prepare BIO-1000 appeals for review by a 
single physician.  Q2A finally developed a mail merge letter 
that automatically denied BIO-1000 claims without any 
review. 
 From about January 2007 to the present, RTS replaced 
Q2A, contracting with HHS to serve as the QIC responsible 
for review of all DME claim denials throughout the country.  
RTS consistently denied BIO-1000 claims, often as medically 
unreasonable and unnecessary.  Like Q2A, RTS arrived at its 
decisions without performing the physician review required 
by the Medicare Act, HHS regulations, and its Government 
contract.  RTS employed only two physicians to review the 
more than one hundred thousand annual appeals of claim 
denials. 
 On July 26, 2007, BioniCare declared bankruptcy.  
Amended Complaint at ¶ 10, Almy v. Sebelius, No. 08-cv-
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01245 (D. Md. May 28, 2008).  The bankruptcy trustee then 
sued HHS, seeking the reversal of the denial of seven groups 
of BIO-1000 claims as neither medically reasonable nor 
necessary.  Id. at ¶¶ 1-6.  During discovery, HHS produced 
almost 35,000 pages of documents, Statement of Material 
Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
(“Summary Judgment Submission”) at ¶¶ 22-27, Almy v. 
Sebelius, No. 08-cv-01245 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2009), at least 
some of which contained personal medical information 
related to individual beneficiaries, id. at ¶¶ 46-47.  On the 
trustee’s behalf, Zizic “personally reviewed the medical 
records for claims that [we]re the subject of th[at] complaint 
and based on [his] experience and expertise . . . , explained 
why the BIO-1000 was reasonable and medically necessary 
for the beneficiary.”  Id. at ¶ 68.  The trustee moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that the QICs, which were 
“funded by a contract with [HHS],” id. at ¶ 13, “subjected 
none of the [BIO-1000] claims to physician or nurse review,” 
id. at ¶ 66 (citations omitted), despite the fact that they were 
“required to use a panel of physicians or other appropriate 
health care professionals,” id. at ¶ 13 (quotation omitted).  
The trustee also alleged that the coverage decisions of the 
QICs on the medical reasonableness and necessity of the 
BIO-1000 were inconsistent.  Id. at ¶¶ 44-45. 
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C. 
 On December 4, 2009, Zizic filed his complaint 
asserting FCA claims against Q2A and RTS,4
                                              
4 On May 20, 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 
Stat. 1617 (2009), “amended the FCA and re-designated 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) as 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) as 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).”  United 
States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 
295, 303 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because Zizic alleged that Q2A 
violated the FCA from July 2005 to about December 2006, he 
asserted claims against it under § 3729(a)(1) and (a)(2) (pre-
FERA), and because Zizic alleged that RTS violated the FCA 
from about January 2007 to the present, he asserted claims 
against it under both § 3729(a)(1) and (a)(2) (pre-FERA) and 
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) (post-FERA).  Here, we are not 
concerned with the differences between the pre- and post-
FERA versions of the FCA because Zizic’s “underlying 
burden to prove a substantive violation of the FCA is in no 
way intertwined with his burden to establish jurisdiction 
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730.”  Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 515. 
 to which he 
attached van Halem’s affidavit.  The Government declined to 
intervene.  Q2A and RTS moved to dismiss Zizic’s complaint 
with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
Rule 12(b)(1).  Zizic filed an opposition, which included a 
request for leave to amend his complaint, but which did not 
include a draft amended complaint.  The District Court, after 
holding a hearing, granted the motions to dismiss the 
complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the 
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allegations against Q2A and RTS were based on public 
disclosures, and because Zizic was not an original source of 
that information.5
II. 
  Zizic timely appealed. 
 Zizic argues that the District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and under 
the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a).  We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
of the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction under the FCA’s public disclosure bar, United 
States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 
514 (3d Cir. 2007), and we review the District Court’s 
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice for an abuse of 
discretion, United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health 
Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Zizic concedes that the District Court correctly 
concluded that Q2A and RTS launched a factual, rather than 
facial, jurisdictional attack, Zizic’s Opening Br. at 19, by 
challenging “the actual failure of [his] claims to comport with 
                                              
5 Q2A and RTS also moved to dismiss Zizic’s 
complaint for failure to allege fraud with particularity, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b), and for failure to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Because the District 
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, it did not address these issues, and because we 
will affirm the District Court on the same basis, neither will 
we. 
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the jurisdictional prerequisites contained in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4),” App. at 6 (quoting Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 514).  
Thus, we may properly consult evidence outside Zizic’s 
pleadings.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 514.  Significantly, 
Zizic bears the burden of persuasion of establishing 
jurisdiction, see id., and his jurisdictional allegations are not 
entitled to a presumption of truthfulness, see id. at 509 n.4. 
III. 
 In this appeal, Zizic asks us to reverse the District 
Court on three alternative grounds.  First, Zizic asserts that 
the District Court erred in concluding that the FCA’s public 
disclosure bar applied to his case because his allegations 
against Q2A and RTS were not based on public disclosures.  
Second, Zizic claims that even if his allegations against Q2A 
and RTS were based on public disclosures, the District Court 
erred in concluding that the public disclosure bar applied to 
his case because he was an original source of that 
information.  Third, Zizic contends that even if the public 
disclosure bar did apply to his case, the District Court abused 
its discretion in dismissing his complaint with prejudice.  We 
address and reject these arguments in the following 
discussion. 
A. 
The District Court concluded that the FCA’s public 
disclosure bar divested it of subject matter jurisdiction over 
Zizic’s claims in part because his claims against Q2A and 
RTS were based on the public disclosure of transactions 
warranting an inference of fraud in the Almy litigation.  Zizic 
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disputes the District Court’s determination, arguing that the 
Almy litigation did not publicly disclose any fraudulent 
transaction on which his claims could have been based.  We 
disagree. 
The public disclosure bar, in pertinent part, withdraws 
jurisdiction over a qui tam suit that is “based upon the public 
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a . . . civil . . . 
hearing.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).  In other words, the 
public disclosure bar applies if:  “(1) there was a ‘public 
disclosure;’ (2) ‘in a . . . civil . . . hearing . . . ;’ (3) of 
‘allegations or transactions’ of the fraud; [and] (4) that the 
relator’s action was ‘based upon.’”  United States ex rel. 
Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citation omitted).  Although the purpose of the public 
disclosure bar is “to strike a balance between encouraging 
private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic 
lawsuits,” Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 295 (2010), it has 
a “generally broad scope,” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United 
States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011). 
1. 
 Starting out with the first and second elements, we 
analyze whether “information was [publicly] disclosed via 
one of the sources listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A).”  Atkinson, 473 
F.3d at 519.  The District Court held that “civil litigation 
hearings are § 3730(e)(4)(A) public disclosures.”  App. at 7.  
Zizic does not contest this conclusion.  We too hold that the 
Almy litigation publicly disclosed the information included in 
the Summary Judgment Submission filed by the trustee, see 
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Paranich, 396 F.3d at 334 (holding that the public disclosure 
bar precludes qui tam suits based on a complaint filed with 
the court and available to the public), and the discovery 
produced by HHS, see United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, 
Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. The Prudential Ins. Co., 944 
F.2d 1149, 1158 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding the same with 
respect to “discovery material . . . not under any court 
imposed limitation as to its use”). 
2. 
Moving on to the third element, we consider whether 
the information publicly disclosed in the Almy litigation 
constituted allegations or transactions of fraud.6
We have adopted a formula to represent when 
information publicly disclosed in a specified source qualifies 
as an allegation or transaction of fraud: 
  An 
allegation of fraud is an explicit accusation of wrongdoing.  
United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 
741 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Wilson, 
559 U.S. 280.  A transaction warranting an inference of fraud 
is one that is composed of a misrepresented state of facts plus 
the actual state of facts.  Id. 
                                              
6 The FCA “bars suits based on publicly disclosed 
‘allegations or transactions,’ not information.”  Dunleavy, 123 
F.3d at 740 (quoting Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 
1418 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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“If X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of 
fraud and X and Y represent its essential 
elements.  In order to disclose the fraudulent 
transaction publicly, the combination of X and 
Y must be revealed, from which readers or 
listeners may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that 
fraud has been committed.” 
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. 
v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).  The essential 
elements of the allegation of fraud [Z] are “a misrepresented 
[X] and a true [Y] state of facts.”  Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 519 
(citation omitted).  Thus, the public disclosure bar applies “if 
either Z (fraud) or both X (misrepresented facts) and Y (true 
facts) are [publicly] disclosed by way of a listed source.”  Id. 
The District Court decided that the Summary 
Judgment Submission publicly disclosed a transaction 
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warranting an inference of fraud.7
“Although the Medicare regulations required 
physician review at the QIC for claims for 
services or items provided by a physician, only 
two of the claims in [a certain case] show any 
indicia of physician review and only a small 
number of claims in [the same case] have 
indicia of nurse review.  None of the claims in 
the other cases have any evidence of nurse or 
physician review.  In fact, the QIC that 
originally reviewed claims for the BIO-1000 
subjected none of the claims to physician or 
nurse review.” 
  The District Court’s 
reasoning centered on the trustee’s statement: 
                                              
7 According to Zizic, an “inference of fraud” is “not 
sufficient” to invoke the public disclosure bar, Zizic’s 
Opening Br. at 29 (quotation omitted), and “presenting facts, 
without raising the underlying fraud” is also inadequate to do 
so, id. at 30.  As our discussion indicates, our precedent 
forecloses these arguments.  See United States ex rel. Mistick 
PBT v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 
385 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We have held that the public disclosure 
of a ‘transaction[]’ within [31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)] 
requires the disclosure of . . . the misrepresented state of facts 
and the true state of facts so that the inference of fraud may 
be drawn.” (citing Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 740-41)). 
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App. at 9 (quoting Summary Judgment Submission at ¶ 66).8
 Zizic argues that the Almy litigation did not publicly 
disclose a fraudulent transaction.  Zizic admits that the true 
state of facts – that “unnamed QICs performed second-level 
reviews as part of a five-step appeals process that was 
generally fraught with problems at each level” – was publicly 
disclosed in the Almy litigation.  Zizic’s Opening Br. at 28.  
He asserts, however, that the misrepresented state of facts – 
that “either [RTS] or Q2A, in particular, performed sham 
second-level Medicare reviews in violation of Medicare 
regulations and statutes and their contracts” – was not.  Id. 
  
However, The District Court did not separate out the 
misrepresented facts and the true facts. 
                                              
8 Zizic implies that the District Court should not have 
considered the Summary Judgment Submission.  Zizic’s 
Opening Br. at 29 n.4 (“It is important to note that Plaintiffs 
never mentioned or referred to these prior proceedings in their 
Complaint.  The District Court relied entirely on Appellees’ 
Motions to Dismiss[, which referenced the Almy litigation.]”).  
We find this suggestion difficult to square with Zizic’s 
acknowledgement that “[p]leadings in the Almy Litigation, 
which the District Court relied on in its decision, are 
appropriate in resolving a factual attack on subject matter 
jurisdiction.”  Zizic’s Reply Br. at 14 (citation omitted).  In 
any event, the District Court appropriately reviewed external 
evidence in this factual challenge to jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1).  Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 
176 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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The problem with Zizic’s characterization of the 
misrepresented state of facts is that it is actually an allegation 
of fraud.  The true state of facts, as set forth in Zizic’s 
complaint, is that Q2A and RTS were obligated to perform 
physician reviews in second-level appeals under Government 
contracts incorporating Medicare rules, App. at 30 ¶ 3; this 
true state of facts was publicly disclosed by the trustee, 
Summary Judgment Submission at ¶ 13 (“If the appeal 
involves medical necessity, the QIC is required to use a panel 
of physicians or other appropriate health care professionals.  
42 C.F.R. § 405.968(a).  If the item is provided by a 
physician, the QIC must use a physician when conducting the 
reconsideration.  42 C.F.R. § 405.968(c)(3).”  Similarly, the 
misrepresented state of facts, as set forth in Zizic’s complaint, 
is that Q2A and RTS received payment under those contracts 
despite their failure to perform such services, App. at 55 ¶ 
153; this misrepresented state of facts was also publicly 
disclosed by the trustee, Summary Judgment Submission at 
¶ 13 (“[The QIC] is . . . funded by a contract with [HHS]”); 
id. at ¶ 66 (“None of the claims . . . have any evidence of 
nurse or physician review [by the QIC].”).  Thus, we hold that 
the Almy litigation publicly disclosed a fraudulent transaction. 
3. 
 Finishing up with the fourth element, we decide 
“whether the relator’s complaint is based on those [public] 
disclosures.”  Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 519.  To be based on 
allegations or transactions of fraud, claims need not be 
“actually derived from” public disclosures.  United States ex 
rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 186 
F.3d 376, 385-88 (3d Cir. 1999).  Rather, claims need only be 
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“supported by” or “substantially similar to” public 
disclosures.  Id. 
The District Court concluded that Zizic’s claims were 
substantially similar to the fraud allegation that could be 
inferred from the fraudulent transaction publicly disclosed in 
the Almy litigation.  Zizic contends that his claims were not 
based on that public disclosure because “the Almy Litigation 
never identifies or refers to [RTS] or Q2A.”  Zizic’s Opening 
Br. at 31.  Zizic attempts to analogize this case to the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 
635 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2011).  There, the relator alleged that a 
certain chiropractor submitted fraudulent bills to Medicare, 
and an HHS report publicly disclosed that about half of a 
sample of chiropractors engaged in similar improper conduct.  
The court reasoned that the public disclosure alone would not 
support an FCA suit because it did not reveal any particular 
responsible party.  Instead, it was only the relator’s 
identification of an individual chiropractor, which placed that 
particular provider among the unnamed wrongdoers 
referenced in the report, that enabled an FCA suit.  Thus, the 
court held that the relator’s claims were not based on the 
public disclosure. 
Q2A and RTS counter that this case is comparable to 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Gear v. 
Emergency Med. Assocs. of Ill., Inc., 436 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 
2006).  There, the relator alleged that a certain teaching 
hospital submitted fraudulent bills to Medicare, but 
Government and media reports publicly disclosed the same 
fraud throughout that industry.  The court rejected the 
relator’s argument that it was impossible to infer the identity 
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of the particular provider he accused from the public 
disclosures inculpating each and every teaching hospital, and 
ruled that “[i]ndustry-wide public disclosures bar qui tam 
actions against any defendant who is directly identifiable 
from the public disclosures.”  Id. at 729 (citations omitted).  
Thus, the court held that the relator’s claims were based on 
the public disclosures. 
 This case is closer to Gear than to Baltazar.  Even if 
Q2A and RTS were not actually identified in the Almy 
litigation, they were directly identifiable from that public 
disclosure.  According to Zizic’s complaint, the QIC industry 
is an industry of one; Q2A and RTS were the only QICs 
during their respective contractual terms.  App. at 32 ¶¶ 12 & 
15.  Additionally, the identities of Q2A and RTS were 
publicly available.  HHS, Listing of Active Contracts–Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 31 (2011), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/smallbusiness/Active%20Contracts
/pdf/cms.pdf.  Because Q2A and RTS were directly 
identifiable from the Almy litigation, Zizic’s claims are 
substantially similar to the fraudulent transactions in the 
Summary Judgment Submission. 
 Separately, Zizic argues that his claims are not 
substantially similar to the Almy litigation because he added 
some information to the trustee’s account of the fraudulent 
transaction.  For example, Zizic points out that the trustee 
only alleged that QIC coverage decisions about medical 
reasonableness and necessity were inconsistent, see Summary 
Judgment Submission at ¶¶ 44-45, while he added an 
allegation that a particular nurse-reviewer at RTS was 
responsible for the inconsistent coverage determinations, 
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App. at 48 ¶ 124.  Zizic’s complaint does add some minor 
details to the trustee’s description of the fraudulent 
transaction. 
 Nonetheless, the public disclosure bar is not confined 
to actions “solely based upon” public disclosures.  Glaser v. 
Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir. 
2009) (citing United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth 
Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997); Fed. 
Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 451 (5th 
Cir. 1995)).  Instead, the public disclosure bar covers actions 
simply “based upon” public disclosures, including actions 
“even partly based upon” such allegations or transactions.  Id. 
(quoting United States ex rel. The Precision Co. v. Koch 
Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992)).  We 
conclude that Zizic’s additional information, i.e., the identity 
of the QIC employee responsible for the inconsistent 
coverage determinations, is too insubstantial to prevent his 
otherwise substantially similar allegations from being based 
on the Almy litigation.  Therefore, we hold that Zizic’s claims 
against Q2A and RTS were based on the publicly disclosed 
fraudulent transaction in the Almy litigation.9
                                              
9 Because we agree with the District Court that Zizic’s 
claims against Q2A and RTS were based on the public 
disclosure of a fraudulent transaction in the Almy litigation, 
we express no opinion on the District Court’s conclusion that 
Zizic’s claims were also based on public disclosures of 
fraudulent transactions in the Medicare administrative 
hearings. 
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B. 
 The District Court’s conclusion that the FCA’s public 
disclosure bar deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction over 
Zizic’s claims was also based on its determination that Zizic 
was not an original source of that information.  Zizic protests, 
arguing that he had direct and independent knowledge of the 
information on which his allegations against Q2A and RTS 
were based.  We cannot agree. 
 Even if the public disclosure bar would otherwise 
apply to a claim, it does not when “the person bringing the 
action is an original source of the information.”  31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)(A).  The term “‘original source’ means an 
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the 
information on which the allegations are based and has 
voluntarily provided the information to the Government 
before filing an action . . . which is based on the information.”  
§ 3730(e)(4)(B).  The word “information” in turn refers to the 
facts on which the relator’s allegations are based, not the facts 
on which the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions of 
fraud are based.  Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 
U.S. 457, 470-72 (2007). 
1. 
 The District Court determined that Zizic lacked direct 
knowledge to the extent his claims against Q2A depended on 
van Halem’s affidavit.  A relator possesses direct knowledge 
if he obtains it without any “intervening agency, 
instrumentality, or influence.”  Paranich, 396 F.3d at 335 
(quotation omitted).  In other words, direct knowledge is 
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based on “first-hand” information, id. at 336 (quoting United 
States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps.’ Club, 105 F.3d 
675, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1997)), and it is gained “by the relator’s 
own efforts, and not by the labors of others,” id. (quoting 
United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, 
Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 Zizic argues that his knowledge was direct.  He asserts 
that “no document was ever provided by any third party 
stating that medical reviews by Q2A . . . were not done . . . in 
the Medicare Appeal.”  Zizic’s Opening Br. at 42 (emphasis 
omitted).  However, van Halem provided that exact 
information in his affidavit.  App. at 62 ¶ 17 (“[Q2A] simply 
issued a denial with a mail merge program without according 
the claims any review.”). 
 Zizic also contends that he had direct knowledge from 
his personal participation in the ALJ appeals and that van 
Halem’s affidavit “merely substantiated” his “suspicion of 
fraud.”  Zizic’s Reply Br. at 13.  Zizic analogizes his case to 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Springfield.  There, civil 
discovery publicly disclosed information that did not 
constitute allegations or transactions of fraud, but that did 
pique the relator’s curiosity.  The relator then “conduct[ed] its 
own investigation” of that information, 14 F.3d at 656, by 
“interview[ing] with individuals and businesses identified” in 
the discovery, id. at 657.  Because the relator “bridged the 
gap” between the innocuous publicly disclosed information 
and the allegation of fraud through “its own efforts and 
experience,” the court held that it was an original source.  Id. 
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 Certainly, van Halem did more than substantiate 
Zizic’s suspicions; in fact, the affidavit is the sole source of 
all of the specific incriminating facts alleged against Q2A in 
the complaint.  Additionally, Springfield is distinguishable.  
At oral argument, Zizic indicated that van Halem reached out 
to him; unlike the relator in Springfield, Zizic did not discover 
van Halem as a result of his own investigation.  Indeed, Zizic 
has provided no information about his investigation, an 
omission that is especially troubling in light of the fact that it 
is Zizic’s burden to establish the direct nature of his 
knowledge.  Thus, we conclude that Zizic lacked direct 
knowledge to the extent his claims against Q2A relied on van 
Halem’s affidavit. 
2. 
 The District Court also determined that Zizic lacked 
independent knowledge of his surviving claims because his 
information was based on § 3730(e)(4)(A) public disclosures.  
A relator’s knowledge is independent if it “does not depend 
on public disclosures.”10
                                              
10 The relator must know of the public disclosure in 
order for his information to depend on it.  United States ex 
rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 337 & n.12 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Here, Zizic admits that he knew about the Medicare 
administrative appeals, App. at 44 ¶ 93; id. at 47 ¶ 116; and 
the Almy litigation, Zizic’s Reply Br. at 16. 
  Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 520 (citation 
omitted).  Significantly, the concept of a public disclosure 
under § 3730(e)(4)(B) is broader than the concept of a public 
disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A); a public disclosure under § 
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3730(e)(4)(B) encompasses not only information that is 
disclosed via the sources enumerated in § 3730(e)(4)(A), but 
also information that is part of the public domain.  Id. at 521-
23.  This distinction is important.  On the one hand, “reliance 
solely on ‘public disclosures’ under § 3730(e)(4)(A) is always 
insufficient under § 3730(e)(4)(B) to confer original source 
status.”  Id. at 522.  On the other hand, “reliance on public 
information that does not qualify as a public disclosure under 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) may also preclude original source status,” id., 
depending on “the extent of that reliance,” and “the nature of 
the information in the public domain,” id. (citing United 
States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703-
04 (8th Cir. 1995)), as well as “the availability of 
information,” and “the amount of labor and deduction 
required to construct the claim,” id. (quoting Kennard v. 
Comstock Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 Zizic presents two reasons why his knowledge was not 
dependent on the Almy litigation.  First, he asserts that 
because only he “had the requisite medical expertise and 
background to understand and review the Medicare appeals 
files concerning the DMEs” that were produced during 
discovery in the Almy litigation, the trustee relied on his 
“labor and deduction” to construct her claims.  Zizic’s Reply 
Br. at 16.  However, we have repeatedly rejected the 
argument that a realtor’s knowledge is independent when it is 
gained through the application of expertise to information 
publicly disclosed under § 3730(e)(4)(A).  See, e.g., Atkinson, 
473 F.3d at 526 n.27; Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160.  Here, Zizic 
merely applied his expertise to the information in the Almy 
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litigation, a § 3730(e)(4)(A) public disclosure.  See supra Part 
III.A.1. 
 Second, Zizic contends that his knowledge is 
independent because it is based on his “direct involvement 
with the DME Medicare appeals . . . over a number of years” 
prior to the Almy litigation.  Zizic’s Opening Br. at 39; see 
also App. at 44 ¶ 93; id. at 47 ¶ 116.  According to Zizic, the 
information in the administrative appeals is not part of the 
public domain because the public may not obtain that 
information by participating in those proceedings and because 
the information in those proceedings is protected pursuant to 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996).  Moreover, only he could craft his claims, thanks to 
his medical expertise. 
 At the outset, the record reflects neither the nature of 
Zizic’s role in the Medicare appeals nor the manner in which 
he gained his first-hand knowledge.  For example, at oral 
argument, Zizic made the unsupported assertion that he 
became involved in the five-step appeals process between the 
QIC’s second-level review and the ALJ’s third-level review.  
In contrast, the complaint contains actual information 
indicating that Zizic’s earliest involvement in the appeals 
process came during the third stage when he reviewed the 
ALJ files.  App. at 44 ¶ 95.  Because Zizic has failed to 
persuade us otherwise, we interpret his argument to be that he 
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obtained his independent knowledge during the ALJ 
appeals.11
 Zizic’s argument about the limitation on participation 
in the ALJ appeals is ultimately unconvincing.  It is true that 
the ALJ appeals are not open to the general public.  
Nonetheless, the list of possible parties who may participate 
in the proceedings includes:  beneficiaries, provider-
assignees, supplier-assignees, and state agencies, 42 C.F.R. 
§ 405.906; HHS and its contractors, § 405.1012; and, 
significantly, “other persons the ALJ considers necessary and 
proper,” § 405.1030.  Of the numerous parties who may 
review the ALJ appeal files, there are many, such as HHS, 
beneficiaries, and other providers and suppliers, who would 
have a compelling interest in bringing FCA claims against 
HHS contractors like Q2A and RTS.  Zizic has not identified 
who, other than himself, was involved in the BIO-1000 
appeals or indicated to what extent the ALJ files became part 
of the public domain.  These omissions are significant 
because, at this stage of the litigation, Zizic bears the burden 
of establishing such facts and is not entitled to have us draw 
inferences in his favor.   
 
 Zizic’s argument about the impact of HIPAA – 
namely, that his allegations were based on “the specific and 
                                              
11 An ALJ hearing is undoubtedly an “administrative 
hearing” within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).  Here, we 
will assume, without deciding, that the information in the ALJ 
appeals is not “publicly disclosed” as that term is used in 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). 
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relevant information . . . in the medical charts,” and that such 
information was blocked from the public domain by HIPAA – 
also fails to save his claims for two reasons.  Zizic’s Opening 
Br. at 34.  First, Zizic fails to elaborate on what the “specific 
and relevant” information was and what such information 
suggested to him.  In fact, the complaint reveals that a 
significant basis of Zizic’s claims was that the ALJ “files 
lacked evidence of the required physician or health care 
professional review,” suggesting that it was the absence of 
information, not the presence of particular information, that 
tipped him off.  App. at 44 ¶ 95. 
 Second, it is true that the ALJ records are restricted by 
HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. § 160.102, and that HIPAA generally 
prohibits the disclosure of protected health information 
(“PHI”), § 164.502.  But PHI, which includes facts such as 
names, addresses, dates, contact information, Government 
identification numbers, insurance policy numbers, and the 
like, § 164.514, is defined as “individually identifiable health 
information,” § 160.103 (emphasis added).  In other words, 
PHI refers to information that could be used to identify a 
patient.  In contrast, a patient’s medical history and treatment 
plan, unlike her name and address, would not usually give 
away her identity.  Thus, the information protected by HIPAA 
is not the information that would lead to the allegation of 
fraud Zizic made against Q2A and RTS. 
 The Almy litigation supports our suspicion.  There, 
HHS produced HIPAA-compliant discovery from the ALJ 
appeals, see Summary Judgment Submission at ¶¶ 22-27, 
which publicly disclosed the medical information of 
anonymized beneficiaries, id. at ¶¶ 46-47.  Zizic “personally 
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reviewed” this data, id. at ¶ 68, and his review “was the 
source of the trustee’s allegations,” Zizic’s Reply Br. at 14 
(quotation omitted), which we have concluded were 
substantially similar to his own claims, supra Part III.A.3.  In 
short, the Almy litigation demonstrates that the ALJ records 
that were redacted pursuant to HIPAA revealed the 
information necessary to raise an inference of fraud.  Because 
Zizic failed to show who participated in the ALJ proceedings 
and who accessed the ALJ records, we cannot assume that the 
relevant HIPAA-redacted information remained out of the 
public domain.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 531 (holding that 
“a plaintiff/relator cannot rely solely on information in the 
public domain to substantiate original source status”). 
 Zizic contends, however, that only he could deduce the 
significance of this information due to his expertise.  But 
Zizic has not explained how his expertise aided his analysis.  
Surely a member of the public could conclude, with minimal 
labor, that the absence of evidence of a required review 
indicates that such a review was never performed.  See 
Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 743 (concluding that the omission of 
required information in a Government report publicly 
disclosed the misrepresented state of facts and completed the 
inference of fraud).  Thus, the amount of deduction required 
to formulate the claims was low.  See Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 
523. 
 In these circumstances, Zizic has failed to persuade us 
that he has independent knowledge based on his participation 
in the ALJ appeals.  We acknowledge that the original source 
exception to the public disclosure bar is a complicated area of 
the law, and that the HIPAA overlay makes this case 
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especially challenging.  But Zizic, by failing to provide the 
missing details described in our discussion, has not made our 
job any easier.  Zizic had the chance to supply such 
information in the District Court by producing his relator 
statement and by amending his complaint.12  Zizic did not 
take advantage of these opportunities and, since he bears the 
burden of establishing jurisdiction, we will not reward his 
failure to do so.  Because Zizic lacked direct and independent 
knowledge of the information on which his allegations 
against Q2A and RTS were based,13
C. 
 we conclude that he is 
not an original source of that information, and that the public 
disclosure bar precludes jurisdiction over his case. 
 The District Court implicitly denied Zizic’s request for 
leave to file an amended complaint by granting Q2A’s motion 
to dismiss with prejudice.  Zizic charges that the District 
Court abused its discretion in so doing.  We disagree. 
                                              
12 See infra Part III.C. 
13 Because the District Court determined that Zizic 
lacked direct and independent knowledge of the information 
on which his allegations were based, it had no occasion to 
decide whether Zizic voluntarily provided that information to 
the Government before he filed suit, another original source 
requirement.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).  We need not 
resolve this issue for the same reason. 
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 Initially, Zizic was entitled to amend his complaint – 
and provide the missing information highlighted in our 
discussion above – once “as a matter of course” within 
twenty-one days after service of the motions to dismiss by 
Q2A and RTS.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).  Since he did not 
do so, he could have amended his complaint “only with . . . 
the [District C]ourt’s leave.”  Rule 15(a)(2).  The District 
Court was to give its leave “freely” if “justice so require[d].”  
Id. 
 Here, the District Court did not need to “worry about 
amendment,” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete 
Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007), because 
Zizic’s request for leave to amend his complaint was 
improper for two reasons.  First, Zizic requested leave to 
amend his complaint without referencing Rule 12(b)(1) in his 
opposition to the motions to dismiss, and a “bare request in an 
opposition to a motion to dismiss – without any indication of 
the particular grounds on which amendment is sought . . . – 
does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 
15(a).”  Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1280 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).  Second, Zizic also 
neglected to attach a draft amended complaint, a failure that 
“is fatal to a request for leave to amend.”  See Fletcher-
Harlee, 482 F.3d at 252 (citations omitted).  Because Zizic 
did not properly move to amend his complaint, “it could 
hardly have been an abuse of discretion for the District Court 
not to have afforded [him] such leave sua sponte.”  Kowal, 16 
F.3d at 1280 (quotation omitted); see also Wilkins, 659 F.3d 
at 315 (concluding that where the plaintiffs’ request for leave 
to amend their complaint was made in their reply to the 
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defendants’ motion to dismiss and without a draft amended 
complaint, the district court “did not abuse its discretion by 
denying their deficient request to amend” (citation omitted)). 
IV. 
 We hold that Zizic’s complaint must be dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).  We 
conclude that Zizic’s claims are foreclosed by the FCA’s 
public disclosure bar because they were based on the 
fraudulent transaction publicly disclosed in the Almy 
litigation, and because he was not an original source, lacking 
direct and independent knowledge of the information on 
which his allegations were based.  We also conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zizic’s 
request for leave to amend his complaint.  Therefore, we will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Zizic’s complaint with 
prejudice. 
